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Executive Summary 
The expected normalization in Turkish-Armenian relations may turn out to be the most momentous change in the security 
set-up of the South Caucasus since the break-up of the Soviet Union. Its results may even overshadow those of the August 
2008 Russia-Georgia war which did not lead to a substantive redrawing of the map of regional alliances and disputes.   
At this point in time, two fundamental uncertainties exist on this issue. The first is, whether the process will actually reach 
its conclusion. That is to say, whether the protocols signed on October 10 in Zürich by the two countries’ foreign ministers 
will be ratified by their respective legislatures, thus paving the way for the restoration of diplomatic relations and cross-
border communications. One sticking point is the question of whether the ratification of the deal by the Turkish Parlia-
ment should be linked to the achievement of genuine progress in the resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. On the 
other hand, there is resistance from within Armenian society among those who believe that the agreement would damage 
efforts to secure recognition of the Armenian genocide. Another big area of uncertainty is related to the impact that the 
rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia, if it does happen, will have on the regional security environment.  
Many within the Georgian expert community think that the impending Turkish-Armenian deal implies inherent dangers 
for Georgia’s economic and security interests. There are three main areas of concern:   
• The agreement will undermine Georgia’s position as a major transit country in the region, thus bringing  
economic losses;  
• The Armenian government, being less dependent on Georgia, will be more active in supporting the demands of 
Armenian nationalist groups active in the Georgian province of Samtskhe-Javakheti thus destabilizing the re-
gion;  
• The whole process is part of a joint Russian-Turkish agenda to reduce the influence of Western powers in the 
region, which will make it easier for Russia to turn Georgia into a satellite state.  
Each of these points constitutes a legitimate ground for concern. However, careful analysis shows that the process of Turk-
ish-Armenian normalization, if successful, would create new opportunities for the faster economic development of the re-
gion (including Georgia), and would help bring it closer to Europe. So, on balance, the potential benefits of a Turkish-
Armenian rapprochement are likely to outweigh the potential risks.  
The Georgian government has little capacity to influence the process of normalization and there is no reason for Georgia 
to pursue a more active role on this issue. However, there are several policy areas to focus on in this regard:  
• The Georgian government should more clearly state its support for improved Turkish-Armenian relations, espe-
cially if this is linked to achieving progress in the Nagorno Karabakh issue.   
• The government should pursue projects aimed at further developing economic ties between Armenia and Geor-
gia. The government and, especially, think-tank community should be more proactive in explaining to society 
why these projects contribute to Georgia’s national interest.  
• Patient and consistent policy should be continued and further developed with regards to the ethnic Armenian 
community of Javakheti. This should include proactive measures to more fully integrate the region’s population 
into the political, economic and civil life of the country, as well as large-scale public dialogue on best policies to 
pursue those goals. Experts and public figures from Armenia should also be encouraged to take part in this dia-
logue.  
• The Georgian government, academic institutions and think tanks should focus more on researching the politics of 
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To link or not to link: The main  
impediment 
The political and economic benefits of im-
proved relations for Turkey and Armenia are so 
obvious that it may seem surprising that it has 
taken this long for the sides to embark upon the 
road to normalization. Armenia is squeezed 
between neighbors that are either openly hos-
tile (Azerbaijan, Turkey), or friendly but still 
problematic: Georgia is in a state of cold war 
with Russia, the closest strategic ally of Arme-
nia, and Iran is seen as a pariah state by the 
West, relations with which are also important 
to Armenia. Better relations with Turkey would 
grant Armenia much greater room for maneu-
ver and improved chances of economic devel-
opment. Turkey would significantly boost its 
status as an influential player in the South Cau-
casus. The normalization of relations with Ar-
menia would also improve Turkey's image and 
negotiating position vis-à-vis the West and 
would undermine the influence of the interna-
tional Armenian lobby that had been busy dis-
crediting Turkey over the issue of what the Ar-
menians contend was a genocide.  
For Armenia, the major sticking point is related 
not to long term political interests, but to col-
lective memory and identity. The formation of 
the modern Armenian identity has very much 
been shaped by the collective memory of the 
horror of the 1915 massacres, and by the defi-
nition of this event as a genocide – a definition 
that the legislatures of quite a few leading na-
tions have shared. However, many others pre-
fer to remain neutral on the issue. Armenia’s 
greatest concession in the deal signed in Zürich 
is to agree to establish a joint commission of 
Turkish and Armenian historians to study these 
events. This implies that the definition of 
‘genocide’ is still up for discussion. The ques-
tion of whether or not this concession consti-
tutes a step too far is one that bitterly divides 
Armenian communities around the world. 
However, it appears that opposition to the 
terms of the Zürich protocols comes mostly 
from the diaspora which is more concerned 
with the genocide issue than those living in 
Armenia itself. Indeed, support for the deal ap-
pears to be stronger within Armenia. However, 
even there, opposition is strong enough to make 
it difficult for the Armenian government to 
make other concessions in the process – espe-
cially those linked to the Nagorno Karabakh 
conflict.  
The obstacles on the Turkish side are linked to 
the issue of Nagorno Karabakh, and to relations 
with Azerbaijan. If the Zürich agreement is rati-
fied, Turkish sanctions on Armenia will be 
lifted. These sanctions were imposed in 1993 
because Turkey wanted to punish Armenia for 
effectively annexing an autonomous region 
within what was Soviet Azerbaijan and occupy-
ing considerable territory around it. If Turkey 
lifts these sanctions, it would be implicitly tol-
erating what it deemed unacceptable in 1993 
and would contradict the interests of Azerbai-
jan, a country that had relied on Turkey as its 
chief ally. The message would be that, as far as 
Turkey is concerned, Armenia has got away 
with Karabakh.  
This bothers Turkey. Apart from the cultural 
solidarity between the Turks and the Azeris 
(who speak a language closely related to Turk-
ish) which is an important factor within Turkish 
society and public opinion, Turkey is linked to 
Azerbaijan through many common economic 
projects. Acting against the interests of its tradi-
tional ally would undermine Turkey’s credibil-
ity in the region. That’s why Turkey insists on 
linking the ratification of the Zürich agreement 
to progress in the settlement of the Nagorno 
Karabakh issue. Of course, the definition of 
what constitutes progress may vary and a full 
resolution of the conflict is certainly not a pre-
requisite to ratification, but Turkey does expect 
a clear and firm commitment from the Arme-
nian side to give up occupied territories around 
Karabakh that currently serve as a buffer zone 
and a bargaining chip.  
This link between ratification and the Nagorno 
Karabakh issue is strongly opposed by Arme-
nia. While the text of the signed agreement 
does not mention Karabakh, the intention of the 
Turkish foreign minister to mention it in the 
introductory statement before the signing cere-
mony came close to derailing the agreement 
altogether. Disaster was averted by creative 
diplomacy (attributed to US Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton): the statements were cancelled 
altogether. However, later, Turkish Prime Min-
ister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan restated several 
 The interests of Turkey and Azerbaijan not only contradict 
those of Armenia, but also those of the major international 
sponsors of the bilateral agreement – the USA, EU, and 
Russia - who all appear to favor the deal being separated 
from the Karabakh issue to ease progress.  
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times that completion of the Turkish-Armenian 
deal would be dependent on progress in nego-
tiations over Nagorno Karabakh.  
This means that the interests of Turkey and 
Azerbaijan not only contradict those of Arme-
nia, but also those of the major international 
sponsors of the bilateral agreement – the USA, 
EU, and Russia - who all appear to favor the 
deal being separated from the Karabakh issue 
to ease progress. The USA appears to be espe-
cially active in promoting the agreement. 
There are several reasons for this. Firstly, 
President Obama needs to demonstrate real 
success in peacemaking having already got 
advance recognition from the Nobel Prize 
committee. More specifically, he gave a com-
mitment to the US ethnic Armenian commu-
nity that he would support the recognition of 
the Armenian genocide in the US Congress – a 
promise he is probably not as enthusiastic 
about now as it could mean spoiling relations 
with Turkey, something that is not in Amer-
ica’s interests. A Turkish-Armenian deal 
would help solve this problem. The West tends 
to share a vague philosophical hope that a 
Turkish-Armenian rapprochement will prompt 
Armenia and Azerbaijan to overcome their 
hitherto irreconcilable differences. Russia’s 
leadership does not think in these “post-
modern” terms and its motives are more com-
plex. However, to mention some of them, the 
reduction of Armenian dependence on Georgia 
would weaken the latter – something Russia 
would like. Moreover, the weakening of Turk-
ish-Azerbaijani ties would make it easier for 
Russia to increase its own influence over Azer-
baijan, which would be a strategically impor-
tant gain.  
The situation is too complex to confidently 
predict whether the Turkish-Armenian deal 
will be finalized. The best case scenario is that 
enough progress is achieved in Armenian-
Azerbaijani negotiations to allow Turkey to 
define it as sufficient to ratify its own deal with 
Armenia. Even in this scenario, it is unclear 
whether this will cause a substantive improve-
ment in Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, or 
whether this will act as a face-saving device 
for Turkey to go ahead. Alternately, the deal 
may fail which could sour regional relations 
even more.  
Taking these uncertainties into account, I will 
analyze the following scenario: The Zürich 
agreement is ratified and there is limited pro-
gress in negotiations over Karabakh but it is 
not enough to bring a substantive improvement 
in Armenian-Azerbaijani relations. What effect 
would such a scenario have on Georgia’s posi-
tion in the region?  
 
Is Georgia losing its transit function?  
 
Georgian experts often view the prospect of a 
Turkish-Armenian deal with concern rather 
than seeing this new development as a source 
of new opportunities. The most obvious worry 
is that Georgia may lose its position as the 
main transit state in the South Caucasus region 
as well as the economic benefits that come 
from such a position. Until now, Georgia has 
been the sole ground route of communications 
in the northern and western directions. After 
the Turkish-Armenian deal is done, goods from 
Armenia may travel via Turkey, bypassing 
Georgia. Moreover, if Armenia did not partici-
pate in larger regional transportation projects 
(such, for instance, as Nabucco gas pipeline) 
because of bad relations with its neighbors, 
with the normalization of Turkish-Armenian 
relations, routes through Armenia may become 
more attractive than those that go through 
Georgia.  
This concern is quite rational. When it comes 
to competition between transit routes, 
geoeconomics turns into a zero-sum game: 
when moving from point A to point B, goods 
such as oil and gas will take only one route and 
countries that are not on it will be excluded, 
thus losing transit revenues or the bargaining 
power that stems from controlling strategically 
important routes. Some losses are unavoidable. 
However, it is important to evaluate how big 
these losses will be and whether or not they 
might be surpassed by benefits that come from 
other aspects of the process.  
Pending Normalization of Turkish-Armenian Relations: Implications for Georgia 
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CIPDD Policy Review, January 2010  
While complex economic calculations are be-
yond the scope of this paper, several points can 
still be made:  
• Georgia’s role as a transit state will con-
tinue to be an important – but not a domi-
nant – component in Georgia’s model of 
economic development. This will instead be 
based on the promotion of Georgia as a 
business-friendly environment (as recog-
nized by its rapid progress in the World 
Bank/IFC Doing Business ratings), and es-
pecially the attraction of large scale invest-
ment in the energy, tourism, and agriculture 
sectors among others. Income from the tran-
sit of goods is important but not decisive for 
the prospects of economic development.  
• Turkish-Armenian normalization will not 
automatically lead to reconciliation between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan. Moreover, it may 
be the case that the ratification of the Zürich 
protocols is not in fact linked too closely 
with the achievement of progress on the 
Nagorno Karabakh issue. This makes it 
likely that Georgia retains its status as the 
only country that enjoys reasonably good 
relations to all regional players (apart from 
Russia) and will continue to be an attractive 
partner for many regional transportation 
projects. For example, it is often said that 
Turkish-Armenian rapprochement would 
render the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway pro-
ject redundant, because the renovation of 
the existing railway through the Armenian 
town of Gyumri is much cheaper. However, 
in lieu of a full-scale normalization of rela-
tions between Armenia and Azerbaijan, a 
railway connection between the latter and 
Turkey through Georgia will still be needed.  
• Even in the absolute best case scenario, one 
in which the Turkish-Armenian deal is fol-
lowed by the normalization of relations be-
tween Armenia and Azerbaijan, the overall 
advantages for the political and economic 
development of the region may be so huge 
that the benefits for Georgia are likely to 
outweigh the cost of lost transit revenues.  
 
The Javakheti Armenians issue 
Another concern shared by a number of Geor-
gian analysts is the possibility of a change in 
attitude of the Armenian government towards 
issues related to ethnic Armenians in the Geor-
gian province of Samtskhe-Javakheti. Two dis-
tricts in the region, Akhalkalaki and Ninots-
minda (often referred to as Javakheti), border 
on Armenia and have a population that is over 
95 percent ethnic Armenian, most of whom do 
not know the Georgian language and are 
weakly integrated into Georgian society. There 
have been fears that Javakheti Armenians may 
mobilize around nationalist slogans, which 
could mean separatist aspirations at worst, or 
calls for regional autonomy that many Georgi-
ans perceive as the first step towards separa-
tism. However, while there are indeed national-
ist organizations in Javakheti that accuse the 
Georgian government of treating minorities 
unfairly and try to mobilize people around na-
tionalist issues, the province has been largely 
free of ethnic tensions since the early 1990s.  
One of the reasons why nationalist tensions in 
Javakheti have not developed is the lack of en-
couragement from Yerevan. The experience of 
ethnic conflicts in the early 1990s has shown 
that the policy adopted by the ‘historical home-
land’ has been a highly important, if not deci-
sive, factor for the development of ethnic griev-
ances into fully fledged conflicts. The fact that 
the Armenian nationalist movement first mobi-
lized around the issue of Karabakh was crucial 
for the development of that conflict. In the case 
of Javakheti, the Armenian government has 
played a stabilizing role since 1990s, support-
ing different educational and cultural initiatives 
in the region but never backing political nation-
alist demands. At the same time, the issue of 
Javakheti is hotly debated in Armenia. The Ar-
menian media frequently publishes articles ac-
cusing the Georgian government of abusing the 
Armenian minority, and alleging that there is a 
plan to  “Georgianize”  Javakheti through  assi- 
Some losses are unavoidable. However, it is important 
to evaluate how big these losses will be and whether or 
not they might be surpassed by benefits that come 
from other aspects of the process.  
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milation and the settlement of ethnic Georgi-
ans. The Dashnaktsutyun party, known for its 
focus on nationalist causes as well as its 
strength in the diaspora, is widely seen as the 
major political force advocating a more asser-
tive policy on the Javakheti issue, and encour-
aging Armenian organizations on the ground to 
be more active and aggressive.  
That Armenia, being involved in an open con-
flict with both Azerbaijan and Turkey, has very 
much depended on good relations with Geor-
gia, may be one explanation of its restraint 
with regards to the Javakheti issue. At least, 
that’s how many Georgian politicians and ana-
lysts see it. If this explanation is correct, then 
the improvement of Turkish-Armenian rela-
tions may change the situation. Or, at least, one 
of the obstacles may be overcome. On Septem-
ber 1st 2009, in a meeting with Armenian am-
bassadors serving abroad, Armenia’s president, 
Serzh Sargsyan, said that Armenia should 
openly support the demands of the Javakheti 
Armenians – such as making Armenian an of-
ficial regional language, or the creation of an 
Armenian-language university there. This 
could be seen as the first sign of a more asser-
tive Armenian stance towards the Javakheti 
issue.  
The problem does indeed merit close attention. 
Concessions made to Turkey on genocide rec-
ognition and – possibly under international 
pressure – the Karabakh issue could expose 
Serzh Sargsyan’s government to criticism from 
nationalists. Opponents may use any conces-
sions to depict Sargsyan as a weak leader and 
accuse him of compromising on matters of 
principle for ‘lowly’ economic gains. This may 
create a temptation to compensate by raising 
the issue of Javakheti, thus placating national-
ist critics of the government. The September 1st 
public statement may be a sign of this taking 
place. Other similar diplomatic steps may fol-
low.  
The main question is how far this new asser-
tiveness will go, and whether it will destabilize 
Javakheti? A significant rise in nationalist ten-
sions in Javakheti cannot be ruled out if there 
is encouragement from Armenia. However, all 
things considered, a major conflict with Geor-
gia is hardly in Armenia’s strategic interest 
even if its relations with Turkey were to im-
prove.  
Moreover, Turkish-Armenian reconciliation 
would take some heat out of what is currently 
the most potent nationalist issue – that of geno-
cide recognition. This may ultimately 
strengthen position of the pragmatists vis-à-vis 
the nationalists within Armenian politics. 
While the nationalist Dashnak party withdrew 
from the Armenian government over the Turk-
ish issue, former president and opposition 
leader, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, expressed his 
support for the government’s position on the 
normalization of ties with Turkey. This may be 
a sign of such a regrouping taking place within 
Armenian politics, with the political forces that 
may benefit from stirring up tensions in Javak-
heti losing some clout.  
 
Possible geopolitical implications 
 
Turkish-Armenian rapprochement may affect 
the balance of power between the main geopo-
litical actors in the South Caucasus, most nota-
bly Russia, Europe and the United States. The 
concerns of many Georgian analysts are based 
on the assumption that the Turkish-Armenian 
deal may ultimately lead to the strengthening 
of Russia’s position in the region. Obviously, 
such a development would not be in the Geor-
gian national interest.  
This is the most important factor to consider 
when discussing the possible repercussions of 
an improvement in bilateral Turkish-Armenian 
relations. For example, while this change 
would reduce Georgia’s leverage over Arme-
nia, this is only dangerous if one assumes that 
Armenia is going to use this against Georgia. It 
is argued that Russia could play a role here and 
pressure Armenia into doing this.  
The perception that Turkish-Armenian reconci- 
Pending Normalization of Turkish-Armenian Relations: Implications for Georgia 
A significant rise in nationalist tensions in Javakheti  
cannot be ruled out if there is encouragement from  
Armenia. However, all things considered, a major conflict 
with Georgia is hardly in Armenia’s strategic interest 
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ciliation would strengthen Russia is partly 
based on the logic of post hoc ergo propter hoc 
(‘after this, therefore because of this’). It was 
widely assumed that warmer relations between 
Turkey and Armenia was a result of the August 
2008 Russia-Georgia War, and that this, by 
implication, means that it serves Russian inter-
ests. Indeed, it was in the days after the war 
that Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Er-
doğan visited Moscow and announced his Cau-
casus Stability and Cooperation Platform. This 
was soon followed by President Gül’s visit to 
Yerevan for what has often been called 
‘football diplomacy’ (the Turkish and Arme-
nian presidents met at Yerevan stadium during 
a football match between Turkey and Arme-
nia). The attempt to establish closer relations 
with Armenia has, to date, been the only tangi-
ble manifestation of Turkey’s new policy in the 
region since the Stability Platform was an-
nounced.  
Thus, the real challenges inherent for Georgia 
may well be more closely tied to the establish-
ment of warmer relations between Turkey and 
Russia, not to the normalization of Turkish-
Armenian ties per se. Is the reduction of West-
ern influence in the South Caucasus the hidden 
agenda of the Caucasus Stability Platform? Is 
Turkish-Armenian rapprochement just an ele-
ment of this plan? If so, then Georgia has real 
grounds for concern. 
The timing of the announcement of the Cauca-
sus Stability Platform cannot be dismissed as 
mere coincidence – it indicates the existence of 
a commonality of either strategic or tactical 
interest between Turkey and Russia. There are 
two possible reasons for the Turkish move:  
• Russia imposed a blockade on Turkish 
goods during the August 2008 war. This 
was an extremely painful signal for Tur-
key, a country that considers access to the 
Russian market crucial to its economic 
development. Therefore, Turkey needed to 
placate Russia. The Turkish proposal – the 
Stability Platform – could only be attrac-
tive to Russia if it implied a reduction in 
Western influence in the South Caucasus; 
influence that the Russian leadership con-
siders to be inimical to its interests.  
• The Stability Platform fits into the concept 
of ‘multidimensionality’ developed and 
pursued by the current Turkish Prime Min-
ister Ahmed Davutoğlu. According to this 
view, Turkish foreign policy has so far 
been excessively focused on relations with 
the West, including, for example, coopera-
tion with NATO and efforts to join the 
European Union. The policy of multidi-
mensionality has meant that Turkey aims 
at devoting attention to relations with it’s’ 
neighbors to the north, east, and south. In 
the South Caucasus, the greatest obstacle 
to this goal has been bad relations with 
Armenia – therefore normalizing them 
became a priority.  
What is the broader motivation behind the shift 
in Turkish foreign policy towards 
‘multidimensionality’? Is this a sign that Tur-
key is moving away from the West? Or is this 
shift primarily aimed at increasing Turkey’s 
bargaining power in its relations with the West?  
Over the past decade, Turkey has been subject 
to a series of setbacks in its relations with 
Europe and the United States. This includes the 
ongoing problems and delays associated with 
Turkey’s bid to join the European Union, 
American neglect of Turkish interests during its 
invasion of Iraq, and a string of Armenian 
genocide recognitions by several major West-
ern powers. Turkey feels slighted by the West 
and wants to demonstrate that it can play an 
independent role in the region rather than serve 
as a vehicle of Western interests. This senti-
ment forges a common sentiment with Russia, 
for whom being snubbed by the West consti-
tutes a deep existential trauma.  
But is this commonality sufficient as a basis for  
 The real challenges inherent for Georgia may well 
be more closely tied to the establishment of warmer 
relations between Turkey and Russia, not to the 
normalization of Turkish-Armenian ties per se.  
Is the reduction of Western influence in the South 
Caucasus the hidden agenda of the Caucasus  
Stability Platform? Is Turkish-Armenian  
rapprochement just an element of this plan? If so, 
then Georgia has real grounds for concern.  
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the formation of a Turkish-Russian axis based 
on a common resentment of Western power?  
This would fit perfectly with the general 
course of Russian policy, but to assume that 
the same is true of Turkey would be going too 
far. Despite the aforementioned difficulties, 
anti-Western sentiment has not become the 
dominant issue within Turkish politics and so-
ciety. The latter is far too preoccupied with its 
internal dilemma of reconciling the religious 
traditionalism of the ruling AKP party with the 
maintenance of the Kemalist tradition of west-
ernization and modernization. A turn away 
from the West in foreign policy would consti-
tute a tectonic shift in the development of 
Turkish society – something one could theo-
retically imagine but does not look likely in the 
foreseeable future.  
It is more probable that Turkey will continue 
its pragmatic policy of finding common inter-
ests with different regional and global actors, 
including Russia. However, if Turkey wants to 
play a more active role in the South Caucasus, 
some competition with Russia is also unavoid-
able. Turkey will probably avoid taking actions 
that would upset Russia, but helping Russia 
become too strong, not to speak of following 
its lead, is not in Turkey’s interest either.  
On the other hand, a stronger Turkish role in 
the South Caucasus does not appear to collide 
with US and European interests. Contrary to 
the perception that Turkish-Armenian rap-
prochement is part of an implicitly anti-
Western Russian-Turkish plan, it is the United 
States that pushed hardest for the normaliza-
tion of Turkish-Armenian ties. In fact, the US 
is pressuring Turkey to separate the issue of 
establishing normal relations with Armenia 
from that of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, 
thus removing the major obstacle to the deal.  
This US policy may or may not be the right 
one. America’s motives – outlined in the first 
section – could be criticized. However, it is 
hard to deny the fact that the Turkish-
Armenian agreement – if ratified and imple-
mented – would remove an important obstacle 
in both US-Turkish and European-Turkish re-
lations (of course, however, this would not be 
a panacea). The implication of this is that the 
South Caucasus is more likely to enjoy closer 
ties to Europe.  
Russian influence may well increase in Azer-
baijan, from whom Russia is trying to buy as 
much gas as possible in order to reduce the in-
centive for it to participate in regional gas 
transportation projects like Nabucco. If this 
goes too far, it would become a matter of seri-
ous concern for Georgia, whose energy inde-
pendence significantly depends on cooperation 
with Azerbaijan. A Russian drive to develop 
closer ties with Azerbaijan in order to isolate 
Georgia would probably occur even without 
Turkish-Armenian rapprochement. But there is 
an indirect link – Azerbaijan may seek closer 
ties with Russia if it perceives that Turkey and 
the West are neglecting its interests by pursu-
ing a Turkish-Armenian deal regardless of the 
situation in Nagorno Karabakh.  
However, while the Azerbaijani reaction to 
Turkish-Armenian normalization will be nega-
tive, it will not be in Azerbaijan’s interest to 
fall fully into Russia’s sphere of influence. 
Azerbaijan will probably continue to play the 
balancing game and avoid open confrontation 
with Russia. Even if the issues of conflict reso-
lution in Karabakh and Turkish-Armenian nor-
malization are fully separated, it would not be 
rational for Azerbaijan to dramatically change 
its policy of energy independence.  
Another indirect result of a Turkish-Armenian 
rapprochement that does not take Azerbaijani 
interests into account would be the resumption 
of Azerbaijani-Armenian hostilities. In a recent 
statement that raised many eyebrows, Azerbai-
jani President Ilham Aliev said that Azerbaijan 
maintains the right to use force, as a measure of 
last resort, to solve the Karabakh problem. A 
new war would indeed be a catastrophic devel-
opment for the region. However, most experts 
assume  – correctly –  that  this  statement   was  
Pending Normalization of Turkish-Armenian Relations: Implications for Georgia 
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Armenia is not likely to lead to a significant increase in 
Russian influence in the region. Quite to the contrary, 
for Armenia, Russia’s staunchest ally in the region, it 
will mean less incentives to follow Russia’s lead and 
greater chances to come closer to Europe.  
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aimed at pressuring the West into being more 
active in its conflict-resolution efforts in Kara-
bakh, and was not an expression of actual in-
tent.  
Nevertheless, the possibility that Russian influ-
ence in the region may grow in ways that are 
threatening to Georgia, cannot be ruled out. 
The major risk is that the West – too preoccu-
pied with crises in the Middle East and Af-
ghanistan and/or internal economic problems – 
may lack the political will to resist Russian 
efforts to exclude the West from its ‘near 
abroad’, perhaps even tolerating the use of 
open military aggression to this end. However, 
the normalization of relations between Turkey 
and Armenia is not likely to lead to a signifi-
cant increase in Russian influence in the re-
gion. Quite to the contrary, for Armenia, Rus-
sia’s staunchest ally in the region, it will mean 
less incentives to follow Russia’s lead and 
greater chances to come closer to Europe.  
What should Georgia’s policy be? 
It is clear that Georgia has few resources to 
influence the process one way or another, and 
it should not try to play a more important role 
in the process. It should act on the assumption 
that both outcomes – the successful reestablish-
ment of Turkish-Armenian ties, or failure – are 
possible, and that neither represents a direct 
threat to Georgian security.  
However, the following should be carried out:  
• The Georgian government should more 
clearly state its support for improved 
Turkish-Armenian relations, especially if 
this is linked to achieving progress in the 
Nagorno Karabakh issue.  
• The government should pursue projects 
aimed at further developing economic ties 
between Armenia and Georgia. The gov-
ernmental and NGO sectors should be 
more proactive in explaining to society 
why these projects contribute to Georgia’s 
national interest.  
• Patient and consistent policy should be 
continued and further developed with re-
gards to the ethnic Armenian community 
of Javakheti. This should include proactive 
measures to more fully integrate the re-
gion’s population into the political, eco-
nomic and civil life of the country, as well 
as large-scale public dialogue on best poli-
cies to pursue those goals. Experts and 
public figures from Armenia should also 
be encouraged to take part in this dialogue.  
• The Georgian government, academic insti-
tutions and think tanks should focus more 
on researching the politics of regional ac-
tors, especially Turkey and Armenia. 
Please visit CIPDD’s blog at www.cipdd.org  to comment on the paper.  
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